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Introduction1 
How firms manage their collaborations is a central concern of strategy researchers 
(Tong & Li 2013). Forming international joint ventures (IJVs), a form of strategic alliances, 
remains a well acknowledged and frequently implemented international market entry strategy 
(Nemeth & Nippa 2013), especially in emerging markets (Lu & Ma 2008; Abramkov & 
Panibratov 2012). Yet they are also known to cause substantial management challenges, con-
flicts of interests, drawbacks, and inefficiencies; many strategic alliances fail to realize their 
expected potential (Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Kumar 2014). Following (Preffer & Nowak 
1976), researchers defined joint ventures (JVs) as “legally and economically separate organi-
zational entities partially held by parent organizations that collectively contribute resources to 
pursue strategic objectives”. The JV becomes an international joint venture (IJV), when it 
involves at least one foreign partner (Lukas, 2013). In cases when new entity is started, a for-
eign firm can enter greenfield IJV with local partner by shearing the IJV’s ownership with 
him. When taking over existing local firm, a foreign firm can also form IJV through partial 
acquisition with the current owner by acquiring only partial equity of the target (Chen & 
Hennart 2004). 
IJVs had attracted significant research attention during the last decades. Thereby, the in-
itial focus of research was on IJV formation (Chung & Beamish 2010) – a variety of key ob-
jectives and aspects have been studied from different theoretical perspectives – see the litera-
ture reviews in (Makino et al. 2007; Beamish & Lupton 2009). Generally, IJVs provide for-
eign companies with advantages to rapidly expand their presence in new geographical mar-
kets, share risks and create economies of scale, learn new skills and get new experience in 
host markets, receive needed resources and facilitate effective resource sharing between part-
ners (Park & Ungson 1997). But while IJVs offer these opportunities, they at the same time 
are also well known to cause various challenges (Kaplan et al. 2010; Ernst & Bamford 2005; 
Dyer et al. 2004). For example, researchers have examined inter-partner conflicts (Chung & 
Beamish 2010), challenges with knowledge transfer (Steensma et al. 2008), partner’s potential 
opportunistic behavior (Puck et al. 2009) and utilization of partner’s resources outside the 
venture for private benefits (Kumar 2010b). The paradox in this regard is that the same ad-
vantages that IJVs provide also make them particularly sensitive to additional challenges 
(Kumar 2010b). 
As the research field on IJV formation reached a certain level of maturity, the focus 
shifted towards IJVs’ post-formation (Chung & Beamish 2010). Research on IJV post-
formation – according to previous literature reviews on this topic (see Zeng & Yan 1999; 
Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Beamish & Lupton 2009) – finds its foundation in pioneering study 
by Franko (1971). It has been 16 years since Zeng & Yan (1999) have published the first lit-
erature review on this subject. While research examining IJVs has greatly enhanced our un-
derstanding of IJV post-formation since then, many scholars are still concerned about the 
dominance of static perspective in several topics, such as IJV research on collaborative learn-
ing (del Mar Benavides-Espinosa & Ribeiro-Soriano 2014), on ownership structure (Iriyama 
et al. 2014; Chung & Beamish 2010) and on bargaining power (Contractor & Reuer 2014). 
Moreover, they mention the lack of precise differentiation of IJV post-formation modes, i.e., 
acquisition by one of the partners, dissolution, or sale to a third firm (Nemeth & Nippa 2013) 
and the debated conceptualization of IJV performance and its determinants (Ren et al. 2009). 
                                                     
1 The preliminary results of this review have been presented by the second author on the XVII April Internation-
al Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development (19-22 April 2016) in Higher School of Eco-
nomics (Moscow, Russia) URL:  https://conf.hse.ru/en/2016/program (Session R-09. Strategy and development 
factors of companies’ competitiveness). The previous version of this review is free for download from the HSE 
site. The final version of this review has been substantially modified, developed and published as the following 
working paper. Specifically, the authors have restructured the article, developed a framework of IJV acquisition 
research, rethought the section of future directions of research, etc. 
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As a result, there are still several often-debated issues on this topic, especially on IJV acquisi-
tion by one of the partners.  
In this study, we focus on phenomenon of IJV acquisition by one of the partners, which 
lies at the intersection of three fields – strategic management, corporate governance (a transfer 
of property rights) and corporate finance (IJV performance). We consider two-partners IJVs. 
Generally, a local partner is more likely to have an extensive network in the host country (cli-
ents, suppliers, business groups, etc.). In contrast, a foreign partner will find it more difficult 
to access such networks, but it has more advanced technologies and management skills. The 
initial purpose for IJV formation was in achieving a synergy between two partners. Suppose 
that an IJV agreement did not provide one of the partners with an explicit right to acquire the 
stake of another one. After exercising the venture for some time, under what conditions are 
the partners more likely to decide to transfer the equity stake of one partner to its counterpart? 
Why a giving partner, rather than its counterpart, is more likely to acquire the partner’s stake 
and will obtain full equity control of the venture?  
This review differs from the previous ones in two significant ways. First, it provides a 
synthesis on IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner as a distinct IJV post-formation mode. 
Second, it discusses the major determinants of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. IJV ac-
quisition by one of the partners means that one partner acquire the other partner’s share 
(Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Hennart et al. 1999) and obtains full equity control of the venture 
(Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006). Studies using such labels as internalization by one of the part-
ners (Park & Ungson, 1997), conversion of joint ventures into wholly owned subsidiaries 
(Steensma et al. , 2008; Puck et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2013), one partner acquires the JV 
business (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), decision to buy out or sell off an IJV (Reuer, 2002), ac-
quisition of joint venture (Kogut, 1991; Chi & McGuire, 1996; Chi, 2000; Folta & Miller, 
2002; Reuer & Tong, 2005; Li et al, 2010; Iriyama & Madhavan, 2014) and joint venture buy-
outs (Marjit & Chowdhury, 2004; Habib & Mella-Barral, 2007; Sinha, 2008; Hek & Mukher-
jee, 2011; Lukas, 2013) tend to explore the same management phenomenon and are included 
to this review. 
Two main factors motivated this review of the research on IJV acquisition by a foreign 
or local partner. First, while several scholars continue to add new and diverse insights on IJV 
acquisition by one of the partners (Chi & Seth 2009; Mata & Portugal, 2015), and other 
scholars call for revising previous research (Makino et al. 2007; Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Iri-
yama et al. 2014), the field would benefit from an overview of the dominant determinants of 
IJV acquisition by one of the partners. There is need for a framework to integrate research on 
IJV acquisition by one of the partners and provide direction for future research. Second, nota-
ble findings in research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners from related disciplines, 
such as finance (Habib & Mella-Barral, 2007; Lukas, 2007; Banerjee & Mukherjee, 2010; 
Lukas, 2013), accounting (van der Meer-Kooistra & Kamminga, 2015), economics (Sinha, 
2001; Hek & Mukherjee, 2011), and behavioral economics (Marjit & Chowdhury, 2004; Sin-
ha, 2008), have not been integrated into the management literature. Applying a modeling ap-
proach, researchers from these disciplines offer unique perspectives on IJV acquisition by a 
foreign or local partner.  
The goal of this review is to systematically examine the theoretical foundation of the is-
sue that has been covered the past 15 years, to identify determinants of IJV acquisition by one 
of the partners, and to suggest important areas of future research. Additionally, we develop a 
framework of research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners. On the basis of this review 
and discussion of the literature, we propone several suggestions for future research on IJV 
acquisition by one of the partners.  
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Background 
Traditionally, multinational companies (MNCs) have formed joint ventures with local 
partners to enter emerging markets, exploit the opportunities they present, and acquire skills 
and knowledge about the local environment. Until the end of the 1990s, IJVs accounted for 
over 60% of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in developing markets (Kale & Anand 2006). 
In a research conducted by Gulati et al. (2008), it has been noted that in 2000 about 10,200 
alliances (equity and non-equity) were formed worldwide, furthermore, by 2007 almost 80% 
of Fortune 1000 CEOs said strategic alliances (and IJVs as a part) have been responsible for 
more than 25% of their companies’ revenues. Additionally, government regulations play an 
important role in influencing the formation and structuring of IJVs in several emerging mar-
kets, where regulatory restrictions typically mandated the formation of IJVs in these countries 
till the mid-1990s (Kale & Anand 2006). For example, foreign ownership regulations have 
been established in several industries in India, the industrial policy in South Korea had a great 
impact on foreign equity participation, and IJVs were the only available entry mode to foreign 
companies in most industries in China (Lu & Ma 2008). However, later subsequent regulatory 
restrictions were relaxed in most emerging economies that influenced on existing IJVs and 
new ones – such as in India many existing IJVs have been terminated; also, in China, many 
IJVs were acquired by foreign partners (Kale & Anand 2006; Chang et al. 2013; Athreye et al. 
2009). Additionally, while until 1997 IJVs were the dominant mode of ownership chosen by 
foreign firms in China, firms entering after 1997 preferred to establish WOSs. In 2004, about 
50% of existing FDIs in China were organized as IJVs and approximately 40% as WOSs, 
however, in the same year only 27% of new investment projects were still formed as IJVs, 
while more as 70% started as WOSs (Puck et al. 2009).  
Nevertheless, IJVs are still one of the most important alternatives for companies pursu-
ing international market entry strategies (Makino et al. 2007; Nemeth & Nippa 2013). A study 
conducted in 2009 by the professional service company KPMG reported that 50% of the sur-
veyed companies expected an increase in joint venture involvement over the next two years, 
with more than half of these being international (Joint Venture …, 2010). More recently, in 
2014 an American multinational management consulting firm, McKinsey, reported that inter-
national joint ventures are still associated with growth in the coming years. In fact, 68% of 
companies from the survey expect an increase in their joint-venture activities over the next 
five years (Rinaudo & Uhlaner, 2014). Similarly, in 2015 a multinational professional ser-
vices firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, reported that forming JVs with local partners has re-
mained a viable option for MNCs in recent years (for example, 78% of the interviewed com-
panies expressed their willingness to enter new partnerships in China). According to data 
from China’s Ministry of Commerce, IJVs remain the second-largest ownership mode for 
utilizing foreign direct investments after WOSs (China Deals …, 2015). 
IJVs, on average, create value for partners (Kumar 2010a), especially partner-IJV busi-
ness relatedness and R&D activity are found to have a great impact (Merchant & Schendel 
2000). This value creation has been proved by a number of research examining stock price 
reactions to JV formation, e.g. (Reuer 2000; Tong et al. 2008; Kumar 2010a; Merchant 2014). 
However, many studies have shown that IJVs also confront a high rate of acquisition by one 
of the partners (see Table 1). Although, Kogut (1991) have used such metaphors for describ-
ing IJV as an “instrument to manage the dependency of the partner firms on the uncertainty of 
resources”; a “bridge” and “a platform for possible future development”. Some researchers 
have agreed that IJVs are associated with a temporary organizational mode (Steensma et al. 
2008). 
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Table 1 
Tabulation of Research on IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners  
 
Authors Location Years Findings 
(Bleeke & 
Ernst 1991) 
USA, Europe, Japan 1960-1990 
49 IJV in the sample, 75% of which 
were acquired by one of the partners. 
(Kogut 1991) 
IJV located in USA, 
which had at least one 
American partner 
1975-1983 
92 IJV in the sample, 30% of which 
were terminated by dissolution, 40% 
by acquisition. 
(Park & 
Ungson 1997) 
USA, Japan 1979-1988 
186 IJV in the sample, 42% of which 
have been terminated by acquisition, 
43% by dissolution, and others were 
censored. 
(Folta & 
Miller 2002) 
IJV in USA 1978-1999 
285 IJV in the sample, 8% of which 
were terminated by acquisition of 
one partner, 12% - were  terminated 
by acquisition of the third party, 
30% - were dissolved, 50% - re-
mained the IJVs. 
(Steensma et 
al. 2008) 
IJV in Hungary 1996-2001 
150 IJV in the sample, 42% of which 
were converted into wholly-owned 
subsidiary of MNE partner, 41% 
remained the IJVs, 17% were liqui-
dated. 
(Puck et al. 
2009) 
IJV in China 2002-2006 
94 IJV in the sample, 29% of which 
were converted into wholly-owned 
subsidiary of MNE partner, 71% 
remained the IJVs. 
(Cui et al. 
2011) 
JV located in USA 
(mixed sample of IJVs 
and domestic JVs) 
1990-2001 
150 JVs in the sample, 49% of 
which were terminated by acquisi-
tions, 9% - by dissolution. 
(Chang et al. 
2013) 
IJV located in China 1998-2006 
19,557 minority international joint 
ventures, 4.3% of which were con-
verted to wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of MNE partner, others remained 
joint ventures. 
(Iriyama & 
Madhavan 
2014) 
IJV with one Japanese 
partner 
1986-2003 
218 IJV in the sample, 63% of which 
were acquired by one of the partner. 
(Mata & 
Portugal 2015) 
IJV located in 
Portugal 
1983-2008 
3697 IJV in the sample, 45% of 
which have been terminated by ac-
quisition; 32% by closure. 
Source: created by the authors. 
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Theoretical Perspectives 
Research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners explains this phenomenon by draw-
ing mainly on transaction cost economics (TCE), e.g. (Park & Russo 1996; Park & Ungson 
1997; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; Puck et al. 2009; Chang et al. 2013), real option theory, e.g. 
(Kogut 1991; Folta & Miller 2002; Kumar 2005; Reuer & Tong 2005; Tong et al. 2008; Chi 
& Seth 2009; Cuypers & Martin 2010; Tong & Li 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Chi 
2000; Chi & McGuire 1996), bargaining theory, e.g. (Inkpen & Beamish 1997; Reuer 2002; 
Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Steensma et al. 2008; Mata & Portugal 2015; Chi & Seth 2009) 
and learning theory (Cuypers & Martin 2007; Habib & Mella-Barral 2007; Kumar 2010a; 
Chang et al. 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Mata & Portugal 2015). Several researchers 
implement these theories in complementary manner, for example (Chi & McGuire 1996; 
Inkpen & Beamish 1997; Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Dhanaraj & Beamish 
2004).  
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
According to TCE, IJV formation occurs due to the lower transaction costs compared to 
alternative international entry modes (Nemeth & Nippa 2013). Foreign firms are more likely 
prefer the formation of an IJVs, when a local firm offers complementary knowledge – such as 
a deep understanding of local markets or access to distribution channels and natural resources, 
which cannot be easily purchased on the host market (Chang et al. 2013). While TCE can 
explain the adaptation of governance structures to changing circumstances (Cuypers & Martin 
2007), it has been criticized for its static perspective (Cuypers & Martin 2007). Following the 
TCE perspective, Park and Russo (1996) and Chang et al. (2013) found that high assets speci-
ficity and the high ratio of intangible assets – in case of incorporated R&D activity into IJV – 
is positively associated with IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Although Puck et al. 
(2009) documented that the decrease of perceived external uncertainty – political, legal, eco-
nomic, and social – is positively associated with IJV acquisition by foreign partner. Analyzing 
another ex ante determinant, Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) proposed that high initial equity 
stake by one of the partner will be a signal of his dominance in a conflict dissolution and 
higher control within the IJV that can has positive effect on propensity of IJV acquisition by 
dominant partner. 
 
Real Option Theory (RO)2 
RO theory deals with decision making under various types of uncertainty. According 
this theory, IJV partner (as a call option holder) will hold the option open either until it ex-
pires or until the value of the underlying asset exceeds the strike price at which the firm can 
increase its equity share (Cuypers & Martin 2007). According to this perspective, IJVs are 
associated with organizational mechanism that help partners manage different types of uncer-
tainty (exogenous and endogenous) in a proactive manner (Reuer & Tong 2005). B. Kogut in 
(Kogut, 1991) was the first who implemented the RO theory to the issues of IJV acquisition 
by one of the partner by examining the effect of demand uncertainty on the timing when one 
JV partner will acquire the stake of the other one (in other words, exercise call option). After 
this paper a number of researchers have examined IJV acquisition by one of the partners ei-
ther theoretically, applying mathematical models, e.g. (Chi & McGuire 1996; Chi & Seth 
2009; Chi 2000) or empirically, e.g. (Folta & Miller 2002; Kumar 2005; Reuer & Tong 2005; 
Tong et al. 2008; Cuypers & Martin 2010; Tong & Li 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014).  
While some researchers (Kogut 1991; Chi & McGuire 1996; Chi 2000; Chi & Seth 
2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014) assumed that all IJVs – both with explicit and implicit call 
options – can capture the growth option value for partners, other researcher (Reuer & Tong 
                                                     
2 In Russian literature the comprehensive synthesis of real option’s application to strategic management and 
research development see in (Bukhvalov, 2004a; 2004b).  
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2005; Tong et al. 2008) criticized this assumption. Explicit call options are contractual clauses 
conferring a partner in an IJV the legal right to acquire equity stake of its counterpart (Tong & 
Li 2013). According to this point of view, without a explicit call option clause the gains from 
IJV acquisition by one of the partners may be partially or fully appropriated by the selling 
partner, who may also appreciate the business’s enhanced value (Reuer & Tong 2005).  
 
 
Bargaining and Learning Perspectives 
The initial ownership structure in an IJV is the outcome of negotiations, in which rela-
tive bargaining power is a deciding factor; subsequently, the relative bargaining power be-
tween both partners explains deviations from full ownership in an IJV (Cuypers & Martin 
2007). The authors (Inkpen & Beamish 1997) were the first who studied the dynamics of bar-
gaining power between partners after IJV formation. They have proposed that learning is the 
most important determinant of changes in relative bargaining power between IJV’s partners. 
Previously, authors have used various metaphors to describe IJVs (Kumar 2010a), for exam-
ple, a “learning race” by Hamel (1991) – as knowledge and know-how are acquired from the 
partner, the dependence of one partner on the other is reduced and the likelihood of IJV acqui-
sition by this partner increases (Cuypers & Martin 2007; Steensma et al. 2008; Mata & 
Portugal 2015). However, other authors (Hennart et al. 1999; Habib & Mella-Barral 2007; 
Kumar 2010a) have found no evidence of learning races between the IJV partners. Addition-
ally, contrary to the expectation of the learning perspective, Chang et al. (2013) have found 
that older IJVs are less likely to be acquired by one of the partners.   
 
A Framework of Research on IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners 
The authors identified eight determinants of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partners: 
complementary assets, ownership structure, control, bargaining power, experience, learning, 
uncertainty and IJV performance. Each of these determinants is reviewed in detail below, and 
the discussion on research using each determinant is offered. As a result of this review, a 
framework of research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners has been developed (see Fig-
ure 2). The proposed framework groups eight determinants and integrates the antecedents of 
IJV formation (complementary assets between partners and previous experience of a foreign 
and local partner), initial IJV characteristics influence (described by ownership structure, con-
trol and bargaining power), shifts of IJV characteristics (three previous determinants and IJV 
performance), moderators – uncertainty, learning and new experience influences, and the de-
cision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners.  
 
Complementarity 
One of the most structural parameter that may influence the decision of JV acquisition 
by one of the partners is the degree of resource complementarity between partners, defined as 
“the extent to which the resources of foreign and local companies are dissimilar yet potential-
ly combinable to generate synergies” (Cui & Kumar 2012). According to Kumar (2010a), 
these complementary resources may include technical knowledge, production knowledge, 
financial resources, and knowledge related to a target market such as customer characteristics, 
distribution channels, knowledge of culture and institutions, etc. While IJVs enable partners 
to combine complementary knowledge and exploit various opportunities (Kumar 2005; 
Kumar 2010b), this is not a sufficient condition: it does not guarantee a positive joint value 
for both partners (Chi & Seth 2009; Kumar 2014). Although, the divergence in complemen-
tary assets between the IJV partners is more likely leads to potential divergence between the 
partners’ understanding of the IJV value (Tong & Li 2013). These researchers have found that 
the greater a firm’s complementarity with the IJV compared to its partner, the more likely this 
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partner will acquire the stake of the other partner (Tong & Li 2013). On the other hand, ac-
cording to learning perspective the proportion of resource complemetarity between IJV part-
ners will differ in time (Chi & Seth 2009; Fang & Zou 2010) – as more partners learn about 
each other, the initial conditions will evolve (Inkpen & Currall 2004). Besides looking at the 
direct relationship between complementarity and IJV acquisition by one of the partners, some 
studies have investigated the indirect impacts of complementarity on IJV acquisition by one 
of the partners through other underlying mechanisms such as learning and experience (Chi & 
Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014).  
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Figure 2 
A Framework of Research of IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The solid line means the direct effect; the dashed line – the moderating effect.  
Source: created by the authors. 
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Ownership structure and control 
Other important determinants that influence the decision of IJV acquisition by foreign or 
local partner are the ownership structure and control. The ownership structure of IJV partners 
determines the division of control between them (Makino et al. 2007). According to Ren et al. 
(2009), control is associated with the amount of decision power, which each partner implements 
in influencing the IJV in order to achieve its goal. Several researchers noted that equity has been 
interpreted as a measure of control and dominance in an IJV – major control of the partner leads 
to the less propensity for conflicts, because major decisions can be easily made by a dominant 
partner (Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; Mata & Portugal 2015). While others argued that equal split 
of ownership creates more interdependence between partners, because the balanced ownership 
structure creates impetus from both sides to save the cooperative partnership (Chung & Beamish 
2010), especially under high uncertainty about partner capabilities (Chi & Seth 2009).  
As larger equity stake do not necessarily lead to better IJV performance (Beamish & 
Lupton 2009; Ren et al. 2009), as researchers differ substantially in their findings with regard to 
the link of ownership structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. For example, Puck et 
al. (2009), Iriyama and Madhavan (2014), Mata and Portugal (2015) demonstrated that majority 
ownership structure is associated with the high likelihood of IJV acquisition by the dominant 
partner. On the contrary, Tong et al. (2008), Cuypers and Martin (2010), Tong and Li (2013) 
empirically found that minority partner will have the higher propensity for IJV acquisition. More 
specifically, Chang et al. (2013) found that the relationship between the ownership structure and 
the likelihood of IJV acquisition by foreign partner is an inverted U-shape. This lack of consen-
sus on the link of ownership structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners has affiliated 
researchers to adopt a different view of ownership effect. For instance, Steensma et al. (2008) 
observed a moderating effect of conflicts on the relationship between ownership structure and 
propensity of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner. Future research is encouraged to con-
tinue this path to examine the other factors that influence the relationship between ownership 
structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners.  
 
Bargaining power 
Bargaining power among IJV partners is determined by each company’s resource contribu-
tion to the IJV or the relative strategic importance of the IJV to each company (Ren et al. 2009). 
Researchers argued that the initial ownership structure reflects the initial distribution of bargain-
ing power among partners and control over the firm (Yan & Gray 1994; Mata & Portugal 2015). 
Partner with greater equity stake may be advantaged in the negotiation with other partner be-
cause of greater bargaining power (Iriyama & Madhavan 2014). Researchers have found that a 
partner with greater bargaining power tends to acquire the equity stake of the other partner be-
cause it has higher control over the IJV and thereby can easily achieve its private benefits 
(Bleeke & Ernst 1995; Chi 2000; Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Mata & Portugal 
2015). Furthermore, IJV acquisition associated with shifts in partners’ bargaining power – “[t]he 
key understanding whether an alliance is likely to lead to a sale is to project how bargaining 
power will evolve” (Bleeke & Ernst 1995). The authors (Inkpen & Beamish 1997) have assumed 
that shifts in bargaining power occur when a partner of an IJV acquire sufficient knowledge and 
skills to eliminate a partner dependency. Most researchers studied bargaining power shifts, pre-
dominantly, from a foreign partner perspective of view. While some scholars have added that the 
decrease of MNC’s bargaining power is associated, for example, with external uncertainty, espe-
cially in emerging markets (Reuer & Tong 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & Kamminga 2015), 
most researchers associated greater bargaining power with MNCs, a-priory. However, some 
scholars concern about domination of such view and call for new studies on bargaining power 
shifts (Contractor & Reuer 2014). 
Besides, according to Ren et al. (2009), Yan and Gray (2001), there are two types of bar-
gaining power: resource-based and context-based. Resource-based power is “associated with 
partners’ contribution of strategic resources and expertise to the IJV”; context-based bargaining 
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power mainly associated “with the alternatives available to each partner during the partner selec-
tion or negotiation stage and the perceived strategic importance of the IJV to each parent” (Ren 
et al., 2009). However, research, which we discuss previously, is often about resource-based bar-
gaining power. The differentiation of bargaining power types may be fruitful for future research 
because, as it has been documented by Ren et al. (2009), the effect of the context-based may 
countervail the resource-based bargaining power, or otherwise.  
 
Leaning and experience 
Knowledge is a critical resource, but access to specific knowledge is costly, especially in 
emerging markets. Additionally, valuable knowledge in general exists in a tacit form that raises 
difficulty in acquiring it (Nam 2011). In general IJVs are associated with “a window on their 
partners' broad capabilities” (Inkpen 1996). Learning is a central aspect of IJV acquisition by one 
of the partners. Specifically, collaboration within IJVs provides opportunities for inter-partner 
learning (Tong & Li 2013): the partners increase their understanding of each others’ complemen-
tary contributions, competitive strategies, resources and capabilities, their strengths and weak-
nesses, organizational culture, and strategic objectives (Inkpen & Currall 2004).  
As we discussed previously, several authors have found that as knowledge and know-how 
are acquired from the partner, the dependence of this partners on the other is reduced and the 
likelihood of IJV acquisition by such partner increases (Cuypers & Martin 2007; Steensma et al. 
2008; Mata & Portugal 2015). However, other authors (Hennart et al. 1999; Habib & Mella-
Barral 2007; Kumar 2010a) have found no evidence of this perspective between the IJV partners. 
Additionally, contrary to the expectation of the learning perspective, Chang et al. (2013) have 
found that older IJVs are less likely to be acquired by one of the partners. More specifically, 
Yang et al. (2011) have examined the moderating role of network enbeddedness on the relation-
ship between learning and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. However, IJVs’ partners learn 
at different rates (Hamel 1991). Partner that learn faster may better exploit the learning potential 
in an IJV to their advantage, and therefore are more likely acquire the other’s partner equity 
stake (Tong & Li 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014). As partner’s learning capabilities develop 
from its prior IJV experience, as the partner with greater prior IJV experience is more likely ac-
quire the venture (Tong & Li 2013).  
 
Uncertainty 
Research on uncertainty has focused on different factors of uncertainty and investigated 
how these factors influences on IJV acquisition by one of the partners (Cuypers & Martin 2010). 
Unfortunately, researchers differ substantially in their findings with regard to the link of uncer-
tainty and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. For example, Kogut (1991) demonstrated a 
significant impact of demand uncertainty on propensity of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. 
Specifically, Iriyama and Madhavan (2014) have found that prior partner experience moderates 
the relationship between demand uncertainty and propensity of IJV acquisition by a foreign part-
ner. Researchers (Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Cuypers & Martin 2010) have found that high 
exchange rate risk results in IJV acquisition by a foreign partner. Folta and Miller (2002) have 
found that low market uncertainty is associated with high propensity of IJV acquisition by a for-
eign partner. According to Puck et al. (2009) the low political and social uncertainty also leads to 
higher likelihood of IJV acquisition by foreign partner. On the contrary, Cuypers and Martin 
(2010) have found that high political and economic uncertainty corresponds with the high pro-
pensity of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. While Tong and Li (2013) have founded no any 
significant effect of political uncertainty on this subject. Additionally, Cuypers & Martin (2010) 
demonstrated that cultural uncertainty and uncertainty about partner’s capabilities have no signif-
icant effect on IJV acquisition by one of the partners. On the contrary, Chi and Seth (2009) have 
found not only significant effect, but also demonstrated the moderating effect of bargaining costs 
on the relationship between uncertainty about partner’s capabilities and IJV acquisition by one of 
the partners.  
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IJV Performance 
The conceptualization of IJV performance and its determinants remains an often-debated 
issue in IJV research – for literature review on IJV performance (see Ren et al. 2009). Research 
on IJV acquisition by one of the partners lacks definitive answer on the relationship between IJV 
performance and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Some scholars associated IJV acquisi-
tion by one of the partners with a failure of another partner, while others documented that IJV 
may be acquired by one of the partners because of successfully accomplished initial objectives of 
an IJV. There are only few studies which examined the relationship between IJV performance 
and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Unfortunately, they differ in their findings with re-
gard to this issue. For example, Steensma et al. (2008) have found that high IJV performance 
leads to IJV acquisition by foreign partner. On the contrary, Chang et al. (2013) documented that 
high IJV performance decreases the propensity of foreign partner to acquire the IJV’s stake. Fu-
ture research is encouraged to continue this path to examine the relationship between IJV per-
formance and IJV acquisition by one of the partners.  
 
Future Directions for Research 
This review identified several areas of future research for scholars interested in IJV acqui-
sition by a foreign or local partner. Most important, new theoretical perspectives such as re-
source-based view can help to develop the field. For example, with the exception of articles (Chi 
& Seth 2009; Cuypers & Martin, 2010; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Num, 2011), application of 
resource-based view to the issue of IJV acquisition by one of the partners appears to be limited. 
The accumulated knowledge about how firms’ resources and capabilities could be developed and 
influence the decision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners, and the combination of the re-
source-based view with other perspectives such as transaction cost or real option may be fruitful 
for the future research of IJV acquisition by one of the partners.  
Great progress has been made in looking at IJV acquisition by foreign partner. For exam-
ple, Chi and Seth (2009) argued that “we assume that it is economically infeasible for the local 
firm to acquire the MNE (e.g., owing to its lack of expertise in managing a much larger and more 
diversified company)”. Although, Iriyama and Madhavan (2014) noted that “the local partner 
may simply be reluctant to proactively acquire equity stakes from the MNE counterpart”. How-
ever, examination of motives of IJV acquisition by a local partner will help to identify new ex-
planations for this phenomenon, especially in emerging markets.  
Another area for future research is intersection of shifts in ownership structure, control and 
bargaining power and the decision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. As researchers dif-
fer substantially in their findings with regard to the links of ownership structure, control and bar-
gaining power and IJV acquisition by one of the partners, there are opportunities for scholars to 
further examine these influences. How do different types of bargaining power of each partner 
affect the decision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners? What resources and capabilities do 
both partners bring the IJV that might shape of ownership structure, control and bargaining pow-
er changes, and might influence the direction and timing of IJV acquisition by one of the part-
ners?  
Researchers lack definitive answer on the relationship between IJV performance and IJV 
acquisition by one of the partners. Sometimes firms are unprepared when they form an IJV in a 
new country, resulting in negative IJV performance, but continuing an IJV or acquiring the part-
ner’s stake in an IJV. In a contrast, sometimes firms have a positive IJV performance, but they 
are deciding to acquire the IJV. Investigating alternative motives for IJV formation and IJV ac-
quisition by one of the partners also holds the potential for bringing new insights into the body of 
literature. In-depth interviews with executives of IJVs may improve previous knowledge of IJV 
acquisition by one of the partners.  
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This review indicates that researchers differ substantially in their findings with regard to 
the link of uncertainty and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Future research might be en-
hanced by incorporating more extensive longitudinal studies. The relatively long history of IJV 
activities by MNEs in many countries both in developed and developing countries sets ad-
vantages for longitudinal studies. Another future research direction involves finding moderators 
between uncertainty factors and the decision on IJV acquisition by one of the partners. For ex-
ample, Iriyama and Madhavan (2014) have found that prior partner experience moderates the 
relationship between demand uncertainty and propensity of IJV acquisition by a foreign partner. 
In sum, this review on IJV acquisition by one of the partners provides several contributions. 
First, the authors systematically examined the theoretical foundation of IJV acquisition by one of 
the partners that has been covered the past 15 years, such as transaction costs, real option, bar-
gaining theory and learning theory. Additionally, this review has found the limited application of 
resource-based view on IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Second, the authors identified 
eight determinants and developed a framework of research on IJV acquisition by one of the part-
ners. Third, the authors provided several opportunities for future research of IJV acquisition by 
one of the partners. While research has greatly enhanced our understanding of IJV acquisition by 
one of the partners; however, there are still several often-debated issues on this field. The authors 
expect that further examination and understanding of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner, 
with sufficient depth of longitudinal empirical research and via the development of more com-
plex theoretical models will advance the understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
Research has been conducted with financial support from SPSU grant (project No. 
16.23.1841.2015) 
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